


# The Value of Independent Thinking

Understandably, investors may find it hard to be optimistic after experiencing the roller-coaster ride of the past two years. But to Richard Skeppstrom, managing director of Eagle's Large Cap Core strategy, high-quality large businesses have proven their important role in portfolios.

- Skeppstrom explains, "the economy nearly collapsed and we experienced the worst recession in 75 years but most large business – excluding finance – performed well above expectations. Managements of these businesses proved they can weather severe economic storms and remain profitable. They may decline in price for a period of time, but the value of the franchises remains intact. The world simply can't do without these products and the management teams are able to adjust to whatever circumstances arise. Gold and silver can't adjust. Treasury bonds don't adjust. Cash doesn't adjust. Change in the investment environment is constant and only businesses can adjust to it. As long as large-quality businesses remain relatively attractively valued, they should have a prominent place in portfolios."
- After the Nifty Fifty, the tech bubble, the commodities/energy bubble, the housing bubble, the collapse, the scandals and the Ponzi schemes, investors have seen the theoretically efficient markets become remarkably

## Top-quintile performance against all large-cap styles since Team's inception\*



	Large Cap Core Team	Eagle Historical Large Cap Core	S&P 500 Index	Russell 1000 Growth Index	Russell 1000 Value Index
Gross	9.44%	7.58%	6.47%	5.23%	7.45%
Net	7.12%	5.55%	6.47%	5.23%	7.45%

\* Composite data shown gross and net of fees; since inception date is Jan. 1, 1996 through March 31, 2010. Please see supplemental performance data on following page.

## Experience navigating periods of market turmoil

Avoiding bubble mania and the accompanying bursts is something the team knows all too well. During the internet-driven technology bubble, clients saw performance lag the benchmark, which continued to be bid up by investors who were absolutely convinced they had to buy technology. The severe correction that followed saw the return of investors paying attention to fundamentals and paved the way for Eagle's Large Cap Core team to outperform the benchmark by more than 2500 basis points, on a net basis, in 2000.

We saw something similar during the energy and basic materials run-up in 2007 and 2008. Valuations were inflated by increased demand, fueled by tremendous growth in the developing world, limited supplies and speculation that these trends would continue. But, of course, they didn't. A year later, in 2009, the strategy returned 31.72 percent (on a net basis) vs. the broad market's 26.46 percent. In a time when many investors were hit hard by the materials/energy crash, Eagle's Large Cap Core clients were rewarded as the managers recognized—and avoided—yet another momentum-driven bubble.

**For detailed information about Eagle's Large Cap Core separately managed accounts, please call 800.237.3101 or visit [eagleasset.com](http://eagleasset.com).**

inefficient. And the Large-Cap process is designed to take advantage of any anomalies that develop. When the market becomes inefficient, like we're seeing now, the team has historically outperformed for clients.

### Recognized success

- The strategy is ranked in the top quartile in Morningstar rankings for the one-year period<sup>1</sup> ended March 31, 2010. The Large Cap Core program's net returns significantly bested the Standard & Poor's 500 benchmark for 2009, returning 31.72 percent compared to the broad market's 26.46 percent. The long-term strategy also was in line with the benchmark over the one-year period and since the team's inception (Jan. 1, 1996), as of March 31, 2010.

### Past performance does not guarantee or indicate future results. Investing in securities may result in a loss of capital.

YEAR	GROSS	NET	GROSS	NET	S&P 500
1982	31.07%	29.42%			21.55%
1983	35.50%	32.88%			22.57%
1984	9.99%	8.30%			6.28%
1985	41.21%	39.17%			31.78%
1986	18.19%	16.58%			18.66%
1987	3.06%	0.98%			5.25%
1988	21.34%	19.05%			16.61%
1989	26.97%	24.76%			31.67%
1990	-6.21%	-8.09%			-3.11%
1991	30.87%	28.53%			30.47%
1992	4.02%	1.92%			7.60%
1993	11.55%	9.33%			10.06%
1994	-1.81%	-3.73%			1.31%
1995	28.79%	26.18%			37.58%
1996	25.17%	22.58%	28.16%	25.17%	22.98%
1997	41.36%	38.76%	34.86%	31.76%	33.36%
1998	37.69%	35.14%	29.02%	26.00%	28.58%
1999	30.79%	28.42%	6.99%	4.38%	31.42%
2000	-16.29%	-17.91%	19.42%	16.59%	-22.42%
2001	-16.32%	-17.82%	-0.56%	-3.07%	-20.42%
2002	-20.88%	-22.55%	-20.47%	-22.19%	-24.34%
2003	31.15%	28.56%	31.15%	28.56%	28.69%
2004	15.97%	13.65%	15.97%	13.66%	10.87%
2005	0.78%	-1.19%	0.78%	-1.19%	4.91%
2006	17.62%	15.52%	17.62%	15.54%	15.80%
2007	1.93%	0.23%	1.93%	0.23%	5.49%
2008	-38.50%	-39.61%	-38.50%	-39.61%	-37.00%
2009	34.21%	31.72%	34.21%	31.72%	26.46%
YTD <sup>(1)</sup>	-7.02%	-7.86%	-7.02%	-7.86%	-6.65%

Please read the footnote for a complete explanation of the difference between the shaded and un-shaded columns.

<sup>1</sup> For the one-year period ended March 31, 2010, the strategy ranked in the 25th percentile out of 429 peers in the large-blend category. The strategy also ranked 58th out of 412; 87th out of 374; and 97th out of 233 for the 3-, 5- and 10-year periods, respectively. 2010 Morningstar, Inc. All rights reserved.

There is no assurance that a separately managed account will achieve its investment objective. Separately managed accounts are subject to market risk, which is the possibility that the market values of securities owned will decline and that the value of the securities may therefore be less than what you paid for them. Accordingly, you can lose money investing in a separately managed account.

The unmanaged Standard & Poor's 500 Index is a broad measure of the U.S. stock market. Index returns do not reflect the deduction of fees, trading costs or other expenses. One cannot invest directly in the index. Index returns do not reflect the deduction of fees, trading costs or other expenses which will affect performance. The index is referred to for informational purposes only; the composition of the Index is different from the composition of the separately managed accounts managed by the investment manager.

The performance shown reflects the performance of our Large Cap Core team since 1996. Most clients have been invested for a shorter period of time.

(1) Year-to-date performance shown gross and net of fees through June 30, 2010. The Large Cap Core Team performance (shaded), shown as supplemental information to Eagle's Large Cap Core composite performance information, reflects the performance of the team of co-managers (team) headed by Richard Skeppstrom in managing the Eagle Large Cap Core program as well as the team's prior performance in managing Eagle's internal, retail Large Cap Core accounts and the Evergreen Capital Growth Fund (Fund). We believe the investment strategy used by the team in achieving its prior performance was essentially the same strategy the team now uses in managing the Large Cap Core program, and so we have linked the prior performance to the current program to provide prospective investors with a supplement to the normal performance information for the Large Cap Core Program. Eagle does not claim the team's prior performance as its Large Cap Core performance record. However, Eagle believes the prior performance is illustrative of the management style of the current team, and Eagle believes prospective investors may legitimately consider this information when deciding whether to invest in the Large Cap Core strategy. The team's record and Eagle's Large Cap Core are identical for the period since April 1, 2002, when Mr. Skeppstrom and his co-managers assumed management responsibility for the Large Cap Core program. The performance data for the period Jan. 1, 1996 through March 8, 2001, reflect the total return of the Evergreen Capital Growth Fund (Fund), a registered investment company that is neither managed by nor affiliated with Eagle. The Fund had seven co-managers at various times during this period, including four individuals who joined Eagle in March 2001 ("original Eagle team")

and Mr. John Davenport, who provided investment research and recommendations to the team under an exclusive agreement with Eagle through October 2009. In 1996, the Fund had four co-managers, including one from the original Eagle team and Mr. Davenport. In 1997 and 1998, the Fund had four co-managers, including two from the original Eagle team and Mr. Davenport. In 1999, 2000 and 2001, the Fund had five co-managers, including four from the original Eagle team and Mr. Davenport. Of the three co-managers who did not join Eagle, one left the co-manager position in October 1996, one left in February 1999 and one, Mr. John Davenport, co-managed the Fund for the entire period. One member of the original Eagle team left the firm in October 2002.

(2) The unusually weak performance in the year 1999 and strong performance in the year 2000 is partially the result of the team's avoidance of technology stocks prior to the market conditions that led to the price volatility of such stocks. These market conditions and the resulting performance might not be repeated in the future. The performance data were obtained from the Fund and were not examined by Eagle. The Eagle team managed the Fund using the same investment style that it uses to manage Large Cap Core accounts. The Fund had assets in excess of \$500 million, and it typically held 25 to 35 stocks. Large Cap Core accounts can be opened with as little as \$100,000 and will typically hold 25 to 40 stocks. During the period March 9, 2001, through March 31, 2001, the team had no assets under management. That period is represented in the data by the performance of the S&P 500 Index, which is the benchmark performance index for Large Cap Core accounts. For that period, the S&P 500 performance was -8.2 percent. Prospective investors should note that, if the team had managed assets during that period, its performance could have been higher or lower than the S&P 500 performance. Performance data for the period April 1, 2001 through Sept. 30, 2001 reflect the performance of one Eagle Large Cap Core account. Performance after July 1, 2001, shows the record of all the retail Large Cap Core accounts. The data do not include the performance of other separate accounts managed by the team while at Evergreen because that data is not available to Eagle. However, those accounts were managed in a substantially similar manner, and Eagle believes that the exclusion of those accounts does not result in a materially different performance number for the team. Fund performance is shown both gross (adding the average expense ratio of 1.39 percent to Fund net returns) and net [after the deduction of an imputed asset-based fee (wrap fee) of 2.5 percent from the gross returns]. Both Eagle account performance and Fund performance reflect gross performance less an imputed asset-based fee (wrap fee) of 2.5 percent, which represents a typical managed account wrap fee. The team's prior performance also includes management of Eagle's Large Cap Core Equity accounts during the period April 1, 2001, (when the team joined Eagle) through March 31, 2002. Eagle account performance is shown after the deduction of both management fees and transaction costs. Please see Eagle's Form ADV, Part II for information regarding Eagle's advisory fees. E1488 7/10 exp. 10/15/10